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While walking down the street, you peer into a newsstand and a single headline among 
hundreds of papers catches your eye. It reads “What Bernie Made Off With.” The reason that this 
resonated with you is because the broker of your retirement fund is named Bernie Madoff. You 
rush over to the newsstand and practically tear it in half trying to get to the article so quickly. 
Upon reading the article, it becomes clear that all of his clients are now broke (including 
yourself). He has kept his clients’ $65 billion for his own personal use (Yang 2014). You fall to 
your knees on the sidewalk, unable to comprehend the horrific news. Suddenly, some thoughts 
start racing through your head. You think, “Why would this man want to steal all of our money? 
Has something like this ever happened before? Why did the federal government not know about 
this any sooner? Even if he did steal all of my money, the government will pay it back to me, 
right?” This extreme example of white-collar crime can raise some key ideas that persist with all 
types of white-collar crime, whether we are referring to the U.S. government’s negligent use of 
agent orange in Vietnam (Tracol) or the branch manager of a bank stealing $20 out of the teller 
drawer. White-collar crime is a very multifaceted phenomenon that needs to be studied in such a 
way to reflect its complexity. 
Before I begin my discussion on white-collar crime, it’s important to define the term. It 
can be looked at in a couple of different ways, both sociologically and legally. In 1939, 
Sociologist Edwin Sutherland provided the first sociological definition for white-collar crime: 
“Offenses by persons of respectability and high social status committed in the course of their 
legitimate occupation” (Henry and McGurrin 2013:1). This definition is a good way to start 
constructing the framework for which I will use to examine white-collar crime. An issue with 
this definition is that it is likely to incorporate some crimes that are much smaller in scope than 
what this paper explore. A more specific definition, provided by the Department of Justice and 
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the FBI is: “synonymous with the full range of frauds committed by business and government 
professionals. These crimes are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and are 
not dependent on the application or threat of physical force or violence. The motivation behind 
these crimes is financial—to obtain or avoid losing money, property, or services or to secure a 
personal or business advantage” (fbi.gov 2017). Using the FBI’s definition of white-collar crime 
allows us to relate more recent crimes to the more modern definition, rather than relying upon 
Sutherland’s definition from 1939. Later, when this research gets to the savings and loan fraud 
cases from Florida, we will see that the FBI definition will relate much more to the individual 
cases, and especially the analysis of sentences imposed on the perpetrators of the white-collar 
crimes.  
When discussing white-collar crime, everybody comes from a certain perspective. A few 
example perspectives are financial managers, law enforcement, the President of the United 
States, average middle-class Americans, and the list continues. What sorts of answers could we 
predict if a member from each one of these groups were asked this question: which type of crime 
is more harmful, street crime or white-collar crime? Financial managers might say that white-
collar crime is more harmful because they understand the amounts of liquidity that companies 
and individuals within the companies have access to. Law enforcement might say street crime 
because this is the most-likely type of crime they will be responding to in the field. The President 
of the United States might be likely to say street crime because the “tough on crime” policy is 
very popular rhetoric for officials who hope to be elected into office. The important question is: 
how does America’s general population perceive the harmfulness of street crime and white-collar 
crime? A study by Michel (2015) looked into public perception of the seriousness and 
punitiveness of violent street crime compared to harmful white-collar crime. When discussing 
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harmful white-collar crimes, the author is referring to white-collar crimes that result in physical 
harm, and he provides examples such as “selling tainted meat [or] neglecting to recall a 
potentially dangerous vehicle” (Michel 2015:128-129).  
For his comparative study, Michel (2015) utilized an online survey machine that allows 
Amazon.com users to access the network and respond to surveys posted on the website. Provided 
on the survey were two scenarios involving violent street crime and three scenarios involving 
harmful white-collar crime. The two scenarios provided for violent street crime are one instance 
of homicide and one instance of forcible rape (Michel 2015). The three scenarios provided for 
harmful white-collar crime are consumer safety violations endangering children, illegal toxic 
waste disposal, and denial of risk and peril by failing to enforce safety measures on the 
workplace and to take responsibility for employees’ toxic contamination (Michel 2015). An 
analysis of the survey responses indicated that the majority of people saw the two violent crime 
scenarios to be as serious as or more serious than the harmful white-collar crime scenarios 
(Michel 2015). When it came to punitiveness of the different scenarios, “participants were more 
inclined to select a non-criminal court for the perpetrators of white-collar offenses, which they 
perceived to be less serious than murder and forcible rape” (Michel 2015:135). When 
respondents discussed punitiveness and financial sanctions imposed on the criminals, they ended 
up recommending higher financial sanctions and less punitive sentences for the white-collar 
criminals with less financial sanctions and more punitive sentences for the violent criminals 
(Michel 2015).  
From the 408 responses provided by the survey participants, it can be concluded that 
“violent street offenses still seem to elicit a more pronounced societal response” (Michel 
2015:137). Taking the information from this study, it seems as though public perceptions of 
Smalley 5 
 
white-collar crime and violent street crime are similar to the ways the criminal justice system is 
likely to prosecute these crimes. However, some questions as to explaining public perceptions 
can be raised. Do people struggle to put all of the blame on certain individuals when the actions 
of a company are what produced criminal conduct? Is there some sort of common thought that 
people are more likely to be victims of street crime instead of white-collar crimes? Or, could it 
be that we see corporate criminal conduct as a result of negligence rather than street crimes being 
a result of purposeful action? Michel (2015) attributes most of the harsher perceptions of street 
crime to the negative label that is attached to street crimes. Since corporate crimes are shown to 
be committed by wealthy people of high power and status, that alone could be a contributing 
factor to the notion that financial sanctions and restitutions are a more fitting punishment for 
white-collar crimes. If consideration is made regarding the entire business that commits a white-
collar crime, people could see long prison sentences or maximum-allowed restitutions to be more 
damaging to the company itself than helpful in reforming the guilty party (Michel 2015). Using 
this rationale, are Americans more concerned about the well-being of our capitalist economy 
than they are about punishing workers of a company who decided to expose its workers to 
asbestos or fail to recall an automobile with a known safety concern? Michel’s study (2015) 
shows that American’s perceptions of seriousness and deserved punitiveness of white-collar and 
violent street crimes are similar to the sentiments shown by politicians and news media. This 
goes to show that public figures and our news sources play a significant role in shaping people’s 
perception of the criminal world around them. 
Not only did Sociologist Edwin Sutherland come up with a definition for white-collar 
crime, he provided many different works that elaborated on the different phenomena of white-
collar crime. In his work, he “exposed the fallacy of relying on official statistics to measure 
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crime because of their tendency to be systematically biased toward reporting a higher incidence 
of offending among persons of lower socioeconomic status” (Jennings and Miller 2006:82). 
Although this paper provides two definitions for white-collar crime, (one a sociological 
definition and the other a legal definition), Cliff and Parker (2017) argue that one of the reasons 
for a lack of statistical analysis on the phenomenon is that very few groups can agree on a 
definition. Lawmakers, law enforcers, the criminals themselves, and public officials are unable to 
agree upon a unified way to describe white-collar crime. Because of this, the individuals 
compiling statistics would not know what to include or omit from their data. I must address a 
question: if the criminal justice system was able to systematically formulate definitions for the 
eight index crimes recognized by the UCR, along with all other crimes in federal and state 
codebooks, what is stopping them from doing the same with white-collar crime? If we take the 
perspective of looking at the term white-collar crime as an umbrella term, similar to the way that 
the term “violent crime” is used, then policy-makers can assign definitions to the specific types 
of crime that fall within the white-collar umbrella. For example, the term “white-collar” would 
include crimes like embezzlement, insider trading, racketeering, and fraud. In this same way, the 
FBI has been able to categorize crimes into two major categories: violent crimes and property 
crimes. Under property crime, it lists burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. 
Under violent crime, it lists murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. What then, would 
keep data collectors from adding a white-collar category, and listing the most impactful crimes 
under that category? 
Cliff and Parker (2017) make an argument that “[m]any people have a general sense that 
they know what counts as white-collar crime and what does not, but they have no specifically 
articulated sense of what qualities separate the class of white-collar offenses from non white-
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collar offenses” (2017:5). The gap in knowledge about white-collar crime, especially with many 
different definitions, “means that it’s often difficult to compare data gathered by different white-
collar crime stakeholders and that theoretical constructs in use by one group may be completely 
misaligned to the needs of another” (Cliff and Parker 2017:5). Instead of deciding upon one 
over-arching and universally-agreeable definition, scholars have recently attempted to 
collaborate and create guidelines that must be met for a crime to be considered white-collar. In 
1996, the National White Collar Crime Center held a meeting where they would work toward 
creating a universal definition (Cliff and Parker 2017). First, the committee agreed upon 
elements that would make up a white-collar crime. These elements were decided to be: “a lack of 
direct violence against a victim,” “the result of an opportunity to commit the crime afforded by 
the offender’s status in an organization or their position of respect within the community, and 
“deception to the extent necessary to commit the criminal offense” (Gordon 1996, cited by Cliff 
and Parker 2017:5).   
Among discussions of deciding upon the elements of white-collar crime, the scholars at 
the NWCCC conference considered parting ways with the term white-collar crime to change it to 
something that gave a more concrete definition, like financial crime or elite crime (Cliff and 
Parker 2017). This discussion must have paid off in a legal sense, because the 2015 version of 
the US Sentencing Guidelines contains a section titled “Economic Crimes.” The sentencing 
guidelines used this heading to describe “theft, embezzlement, receipt of stolen property, 
property destruction, and offenses involving fraud or deceit” (USSG 2015).  
After members of the 1996 conference agreed upon their elements of white-collar crime, 
they came together and came up with a new definition for the term. This definition is as follows: 
““illegal or unethical acts that violate fiduciary responsibility of public trust, committed by an 
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individual or organization, usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity, by 
persons of high or respectable social status for personal or organizational gain” (Cliff and Parker 
2017:6). Going into detail regarding the 1996 conference held by the National White Collar 
Crime Center shows how, even for a conference full of scholars with wide knowledge on the 
subject, it became extensive work just to attempt to fully define and describe the concept of 
white-collar crime. Understanding the difficulties of defining white-collar crime is essential to 
understanding the way our current United States criminal justice system handles data collection 
and prosecution of white-collar crime. The criminal justice system has resorted to defining the 
specific crimes associated with white-collar behavior to solve the issues that come with the term 
“white-collar.”  
 One of the most complex components of white-collar offending for everyone to 
understand is: why would anyone exploit their positional power to increase their own financial 
gain or their company’s financial gain? Pointing out the most obvious explanations first, we 
could use Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory of crime that points to offenders’ lack 
of self-control when discussing commission of crime (Spahr and Alison 2004). Individuals of 
high status and workplace power have many opportunities to commit larger scale white-collar 
crimes, like Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme debacle that lost $65 billion from his clients over the 
course of several decades (Yang 2014). When we use Hirschi and Gottfredson’s general theory 
of crime as an argument, it changes the perspective of looking at white-collar criminality. Rather 
than looking at reasons for these social actors to choose to commit white-collar crimes, it shifts 
to look at how these actors can utilize self-control to keep themselves from committing such 
crimes of opportunity.  
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 In the workplace, what if there were a certain environment that supported the commission 
of white-collar crimes? Spahr and Alison (2004:96) argue that “[s]ocio-cultural approaches 
support the notion that group norms act as the major contributory factor in workplace crime.” As 
part of this argument, the authors suggest that the criminals may be committing these crimes in 
order to either remain stable in their workplace position or to help sustain company profits 
(Spahr and Alison 2004). Where we see the criminal culture come into play with white-collar 
crime is the criminals’ assessment of their own crimes. They perceive their criminal actions to 
have no real associated injury. Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization can be 
applied to this situation. Their technique of neutralization called “denial of injury” is used by 
white-collar criminals to justify their actions by telling themselves that nobody is going to be 
hurt by their actions. In this sense, certain workplace environments can breed white-collar 
criminals that are conforming to the norms of committing crimes for workplace gain instead of 
the ways that street criminals disregard societal norms in the commission of their crimes. Spahr 
and Alison (2004) manipulated the dataset created by Pontell et al. (1994) in order to analyze the 
workplace position of the criminals in the dataset.  
The researchers saw that Hirschi and Gottfredson’s general theory of crime was not able 
to be applied because application would require a higher number of lower-level employees being 
convicted of their crimes (Spahr and Alison 2004). This was based on the rationale that self-
control is not as common among low-level employees, thus expecting to see them having more 
instances of white-collar crime. However, the researchers do point out that that the reason for 
this dataset (Pontell et al. 1994) showing more directors/officers committing the crimes could be 
the high dollar amounts involved in each of the crimes. Had Pontell et al. analyzed crimes with 
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lower monetary amounts, Hirschi and Gottfredson’s general theory of crime might have been 
more applicable.  
     In the savings and loan (thrift) industry, the US government assumes the responsibility 
of taking over failing thrift companies to ensure continued stabilization of the national economy. 
In charge of taking over these failed thrifts is the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). From the 
time it first began taking over failing thrifts in 1989 until the year 1992, it “merged, sold, or 
assumed management of 652 failed thrifts” (RTC 1992, cited by Pontell et al. 1994:383). During 
these four years of RTC action, taxpayer losses amounted to roughly $84 billion while the 
government spent around $196 billion in the pursuit of resolving these failed companies (RTC 
1992, cited by Pontell et al. 1994). Because of the action taken by the federal government from 
1988 until 1992, “2,942 defendants were indicted, resulting in 2,300 convictions in major 
financial institution fraud cases” (Pontell et al. 1994:383).  
All this information contains some moving parts. First, the US Government assumed 
control of failing savings and loan companies to protect the clients of those companies and to 
help keep the economy stable. Second, when government entities took control of the failing 
companies, they started investigating and uncovered many instances of fraud that led some of 
these companies in a negative financial direction. Analyzing this scenario from a more general 
perspective, we see a substantially large investment of taxpayer dollars that are used to stabilize 
the failing companies. To the common person, one is inclined to wonder if that is the best thing 
for the government to do. But, knowing that federal intervention of these companies led to 2,300 
financial fraud convictions in about four years, should we be thankful for the government’s use 
of tax dollars to combat white-collar crime and promote a healthy economy? Overall, this 
venture used by the government was extremely beneficial in the long term, even if people have a 
Smalley 11 
 
hard time stomaching the fact that $84 billion of taxpayer money was spent in the short term. 
Based on this information, just how big of a problem is financial fraud? The Resolution Trust 
Corporation indicate “that fraud is far more pervasive than some current estimates suggest and 
that the cover-ups and complex transactions designed to keep regulators at bay were often 
themselves an integral part of the fraud” (Pontell et al. 1994:384). The researchers came to the 
conclusion, based on RTC data from 1992, that financial fraud must be discovered before 
companies collapse in order to diminish its negative impact because investigating the companies 
after they go under does not reveal all pertinent information about their fraudulent acts (Pontell 
et al. 1994).   
The above narrative makes it sound as if the federal government easily comes across 
white-collar crime, especially in the savings and loan industry. However, there are hurdles that 
the government must circumnavigate in order to arrest and/or convict financial criminals. Pontell 
et al. (1994) conducted a qualitative analysis within federal law enforcement agencies regarding 
the logistics of investigating and clearing cases of financial fraud.  In 1989, George Bush’s 
administration created legislature called the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA). This was the first step the federal government made in the direction 
of reforming America’s financial sector (Pontell et al. 1994). In order for the act to gain some 
traction and for companies to take it seriously, there were three primary groups empowered with 
regulating financial companies. These three groups were the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Resolution Trust 
Corporation. Lastly, the most important component of the FIRREA of 1989 was the enforcement 
power it provided to the US federal government. One of the key enforcement powers it provided 
was the civil forfeiture provision, which allows enforcement agencies to “seize defendants’ 
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assets before conviction in an effort to salvage funds before they are transferred off-shore, are 
consumed, or otherwise ‘disappear’” (Pontell et al. 1994:390). 
Before the FIRREA of 1989 was passed, several events occurred that led to the need for 
government action. The savings and loan industry underwent many deregulations that gave more 
freedom to companies in how they may invest depositors’ funds (Fetini 2008). Specifically, 
Fetini (2008) of Time Business suggests that the poor choices of customer investments were 
made in “risky real estate ventures and junk bonds in an effort to reap maximum profits.” This 
sort of speculative investing is what led to the ever-so-famous savings and loan crisis of the 
1980s. Since more savings and loans companies had been established than ever before, and there 
were little rules regarding how customer money was invested, As a result of the deregulation and 
careless use of customer money, we see how the Bush administration was led to pass the 
Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.  
Methodology 
Because of the increased government power granted to the US Government by the 
FIRREA of 1989, law enforcement agencies have had increasing involvement in adequately 
dealing with white-collar crimes, especially in the savings and loan industry. Taking this into 
consideration, the dataset created by Pontell, Calavita, and Tillman (1999) will be ideal for use in 
analysis of government response to white-collar crime from 1988-1992.  
Participants 
This research project utilizes secondary data analysis, there are no current participants 
associated with the subsequent analysis that took place. Therefore, approval from the 
Institutional Review Board was not necessary and did not take place.  
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Description of Dataset 
The dataset created by Pontell et al. (1999) consists of crimes within the savings and loan 
(thrift) industry originating in Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  
 Included in the dataset (Pontell et al. 1999) are the court docket number (which has been 
extracted to ensure confidentiality of defendants), the number corresponding to the district of 
where the offense was committed, the state, date of indictment, the name of the offense 
committed, the fraud amount (in US dollars), and the total amount lost (in US dollars). 
Frequency tables of the relevant variables will be available as appendices to this report. 
Measures/Variables 
 In the dataset, all information was derived from the criminal docket provided by each 
prosecuting court. Of each category (docket number, district number, state, indictment date, 
offense, fraud amount, and loss amount), the fraud amount and loss amount were the only 
variables that the original researchers (Pontell et al. 1999) had to investigate and compute in 
order to provide accurate information. 
Court Docket Number: This variable was kept out of the publicly-accessible version of the 
dataset. The reason for doing this was to ensure that there was no breach of confidentiality in the 
criminal proceedings or in the time after convictions/sentencings were completed. 
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Prosecuting District: Each case includes a number representing the district where that specific 
crime was prosecuted. For the purposes of this project, it was omitted from any analysis.  
State: With each case, there is an indication of the state where the crime took place. This state is 
also where the crime was prosecuted. The dataset uses state abbreviations to label this variable, 
rather than using the entire name of the state. 
Date of Indictment: Every crime represented on the dataset comes along with the date on which 
the defendant was indicted. This also was not used for this specific analysis. However, it can be 
used by individuals who have access to the court dockets if they were looking at patterns that 
show within timelines of criminal proceedings in savings and loan fraud cases.  
Offense Committed: One of the most integral pieces of information from the dataset is the 
section that explains what offense was committed for each case. This can be used to look into 
correlations between offense committed and fraud amount. In this project, a Chi-Square test was 
performed to determine if a correlation exists between offense committed and fraud amount (in 
US dollars). This will be discussed in the analysis section. 
Fraud Amount: This figure represents that total amount (in US dollars) that the defendant in 
each case was involved with while committing their crime. In many cases, but not all, the fraud 
amount and the loss amount are the same dollar amount.  
Loss Amount: This figure is different from the fraud amount figure in that it includes monetary 
amounts that were lost by the company, not only just the amount of money that was part of the 
fraudulent scheme.  
Data Analysis 
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 The dataset created by Pontell, Calavita, and Tillman (1999) is the source of all of the 
analytical data utilized by this project. This set of data was manipulated and computed using 
SPSS statistical software.  
 Because of the large scope that this dataset covers, it was deemed feasible to use 
statistical analysis to determine correlations between two sets of variables demonstrated in the 
dataset. To begin, descriptive statistics were created for the fraud amount of every variable in the 
dataset. The reason that this was the only variable where descriptive statistics were computed is 
because it was the only variable that was more complex than the nominal-level. From the 
descriptive statistics of the fraud amount (N=646), we can see that the average amount of fraud 
(in US dollars) is $7,101,753.35. This is a decent indicator of the severity of the savings and loan 
crimes that were included in this dataset. Knowing that the dataset is comprised of such high 
dollar amounts of fraud is crucial to setting the perspective of how pervasive these crimes were 
at the time they were committed. With that being said, the maximum fraud amount was listed at 
$750,000,000. This means that it skewed the average of the entire dataset when it was computed 
with the rest of the numbers. With the median being listed at a mere $450,000, it becomes 
evident that the mean of $7,101,752.35 is not as important of an indicator as one would expect to 
have from the mean of a dataset. 
 The fraud amount variable from the dataset demonstrated a standard deviation of 
$36,440,267.85. One more key piece of information to point out from the descriptive statistics of 
the fraud amount variable is the minimum amount contained in the dataset. Surprisingly, the 
minimum amount of money involved in one of the fraud schemes was $0. This means that for the 
specific crime, there was absolutely no monetary value that was involved. What sort of 
implications does this have? This proves that money is not a requirement for one’s crime within 
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a savings and loan industry to be significant. This will be brought up in greater detail later on in 
the discussion section of this paper.  
 To determine if significant correlations exist between the state where each crime 
was committed and the dollar amount of each fraud, a chi-square test was conducted using SPSS 
statistical software.  When interpreting this chi square test, we must know the null and 
alternative hypotheses that are being tested. First, the null hypothesis states that there is no 
relationship between states and fraud amounts. This would otherwise be stated as the state and 
the fraud amount are independent of each other. The alternative hypothesis in this test would be 
that the same two variables (state and fraud amount) are dependent, meaning one variable can 
influence the other variable. Although this test is not suitable for determining how strong of a 
relationship might exist, it can determine if a correlation exists at all. 
Results of the chi-square test comparing states and the dollar amount of fraud in each 
case are shown in the following tables: 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 19029.836a 16168 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 2950.129 16168 1.000 
N of Valid Cases 646   
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a. 16585 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .00. 
  
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi 5.428 .000 
Cramer's V .828 .000 
 
After reviewing this resulting chi-square test table, it can be concluded that there is no 
evidence to support a significant relationship between these two variables. The reason for this is 
grounded in the fact that all cells have an expected count of less than five. Since this is the case, 
there is not enough evidence from the chi-square test to suggest a relationship between state and 
fraud amount. If the expected count for each category had been five or greater, a proper 
hypothesis test could be completed using the test statistic and the p-value. Since this is not the 
case, any test would be rendered insufficient in providing evidence for a relationship between 
states and the dollar amount of fraud in each case. We must fail to reject the null hypothesis, and 
assume these variables to be independent of each other.  
 In addition to the test for relationship between state and fraud amounts, there was another 
chi-square test performed to look for a relationship between state and type of offense that was 
committed. If a relationship does exist between these two variables, it could help identify certain 
crimes that are more likely to happen in some states rather than others. As with the first chi-
square test discussed in this project, the null and alternative hypotheses must be stated. The null 
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hypothesis is that there is no relationship between state and fraud amount. The alternative 
hypothesis will be that there is a relationship between state and fraud amount. 
 The table showing the results of this chi-square test is shown here: 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20287.269a 19694 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 3240.836 19694 1.000 
N of Valid Cases 646   
 
a. 20194 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .00. 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi 5.604 .002 
Cramer's V .855 .002 
N of Valid Cases 646  
 
 In this test for significance, there is another issue with the expected count for the cross-
tabulation table that compares these variables. Since each variable has an expected count less 
than 5, there are no grounds sufficient enough to support completing the entire hypothesis test. 
Therefore, we are not able to provide any evidence that any individual state is related to certain 
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types of crimes. We must fail to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that these two variables are 
independent of each other. 
 Because this dataset is situated to use exact dollar amounts of fraud as a measure of 
study, it becomes problematic to rely on a chi square test to search for a relationship between two 
variables. When the researchers created their dataset, they were most likely not worried about 
this being an issue for their analysis. However, a proposed solution to modifying this dataset in 
order to make it suitable for a chi-square test would be to group the fraud amounts into groups. 
The scale could have categories that are each about $1,000,000 wide. If this were the case, the 
chi-square test would look at frequencies that exist within each category rather than the specific 
dollar amounts within the frequencies. This means a relationship could much more easily be 
determined in the dataset since the fraud amount would be grouped together in more broad 
categories rather than having a dataset that incorporates a unique, specific dollar amount for each 
crime represented. 
 Analyzing relationship trends among such a large dataset is difficult. It leads to issues 
like the ones that came about with these two chi-square tests. Within this larger dataset from 
Pontell et al. (1999), I broke the information down even further to create a bar chart that 
compares the prevalence of each fraud amount within just the state of Florida. The chart specific 
to Florida fraud amounts can be found below:  
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 Using a bar chart to analyze fraud amounts of a particular state within the dataset is a 
very resourceful way to visually see patterns within the data. Rather than relying on test 
statistics, p-values, and measures like Cramer’s V, analyzing visual representations helps bring 
actual substance to a quantitative method of analysis. Upon looking at the bar chart, it is clear 
that no fraud amount has any relatively significant frequencies associated with it. In other words, 
almost every savings and loan crime in the state of Florida (between 1988 and 1992) has its own 
unique dollar amount of fraud associated with it. However, the advantage that this has over a chi-
square test is that it becomes possible to see areas of dollar amounts that have higher or lower 
frequencies than other amounts. For example, this bar chart shows many more occurrences 
between the dollar amounts of $249,061 and $510,174 than are shown between $12,000 and 
$90,000.  
 Noting how the majority of Florida cases fall between the fraud amounts of $132,000 and 
$1,130,000, it becomes easy to see that most of the savings and loan crimes in Florida were not 
reaching amounts in the higher end of the fraud amount scale. Keeping in mind that the highest 
fraud amount in Florida was listed at over $57,000,000, there is a large variety of fraud amounts 
shown in the dataset created by Pontell et al. (1999).   
 Using this visual method of analysis can help researchers grasp some concept of what 
kinds of monetary amounts were associated with savings and loan fraud at the time, but it is very 
important for researchers to keep in mind that concrete associations between variables cannot be 
discovered without completing a chi-square test for relationship between two variables.  
Contribution of this Paper 
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 Completing a research project such as this can have multiple contributions to the fields of 
sociology, criminology, and the data collection process of crimes. However, with this paper 
being a secondary-data analysis of a quantitative data set, the contributions being discussed will 
focus on the prevalence of white-collar crime, the effects of the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, and data collection on white-collar crime in the United 
States.  
 First, this paper sheds light on the phenomenon of white-collar crime in the United States. 
The analysis of this dataset was able to show that at least 646 crimes in the savings and loan 
industry were committed between the years of 1988 and 1992. Pontell et al. (1999) collected 
information about the crimes in their dataset from the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Office 
of Thrift Supervision, and the Executive Office of United States Attorneys. With this being said, 
the dataset includes only savings and loan crimes. Since it omits all other types of white-collar 
crime (insider trading, embezzlement, etc.), criminologists and sociologists alike can come to the 
conclusion that the realistic amount of white-collar crime across the United States is far more 
extensive than this dataset represents. Although the dataset does a fantastic job of showcasing 
specific instances of savings and loan fraud, it is not equipped to demonstrate the full scope of 
the prevalence that white-collar crime has in the United States. 
 Something that this research has proven beyond doubt is that the FIRREA of 1989 played 
a significant role in the US government becoming aware of financial crimes being committed 
within the savings and loan industry. Due to increased power given to the US government in 
regards to solvency of failing thrift companies and enforcement of financial crimes (Pontell 
1994), the period of time from 1988-1992 shows the resulting high number of crimes discovered, 
investigated, and defendants convicted. In the decades since 1992, it seems as though the US 
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government has shifted from a reactive stance of enforcement and solvency to a much more 
proactive stance of regulation and control. Of course, the importance of regulation in certain 
financial institutions (i.e., credit rating bureaus, securities trading) was not necessarily noticed 
until the crash of the housing market in 2008. Without the lesson learned from this event, there’s 
no way of predicting what measures may or may not be taken in order to control white-collar 
crime and its adverse effects. An interesting follow-up study to the one completed by Pontell et 
al. (1999) would be to look at current rates of savings and loan fraud (or other crimes committed 
within other legitimate financial institutions). Attempting to accomplish this would beg one huge 
question: where could the information come from? 
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation compiles data on a yearly basis in order to create the 
Uniform Crime Report. This information comes from voluntary reporting by law enforcement 
agencies all across the country. In the UCR, there are statistics kept for the eight major index 
crimes: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, larceny-theft, 
and arson. In conjunction with the UCR, many agencies utilize a National Incident Based 
Reporting System to instantaneously upload their crime reports to a national database. Also, the 
National Crime Victimization Survey serves as a great supplement to the previous two reports 
because it is able to factor in a number of crimes that may have never been reported to law 
enforcement officials. With these three crime reporting methods utilized by the US government, 
finding data on violent and property crimes is not an issue. 
 The issue comes to existence when somebody attempts to replicate a study similar to the 
one that this research paper was based on (Pontell et al. 1999). To create their dataset, Pontell, 
Calavita, and Tillman were asked by the Department of Justice to collect crime data from the 
RTC, OTS, and the Executive Office of United States Attorneys. This took years of searching, 
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compiling, and computing. If another researcher would like to complete a study similar to that of 
Pontell and his colleagues, they would have to go through very similar steps of compiling the 
information because none of the crime reporting databases include sections on white-collar 
crime, or more specifically to this scenario, savings and loan fraud. This is the fallacy that comes 
from a lack of record keeping of white-collar crimes.  
 If records are not properly kept that inform the public of what kinds of white-collar crime 
are happening and how often they come about, then researchers are far less likely to study it. 
Without scholars studying the many facets of white-collar crime for themselves, the pursuit of 
solutions for these crimes and their associated problems remains at a stand-still. The general 
public is hurt by this because there is no reliable source of information they can turn to if they 
seek further knowledge on the subject of white-collar crime. Without nationally-subsidized pools 
of data on the subject, people will have no choice than to get their information from sources like 
news broadcasts and public opinion polls. Not only is the general public affected, but law 
enforcement agencies hurt themselves by not properly keeping track of white-collar crime 
statistics. If their data were kept and analyzed on a regular basis, policy-makers and investigators 
would start to notice certain patterns. Then, these patterns can be used to inform decision makers 
and policy creators.  
 Whether or not we like to admit it, this country has an abundance of people with large 
amounts of power over economic resources and much less power over their own self-control. 
With some people, this leads to nothing more than entrepreneurship and the continuation of the 
spirit of capitalism. However, with others, this situation breeds the perfect opportunities for 
exploitation of customers, their money, and the trust of the business in which a person works. 
White-collar crime (and specific to this research project, savings and loan fraud) is more than 
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just present in our social world. The study by Michel (2015) indicated that societal responses are 
still tougher on violent street crime than white-collar crime, even when the proposed white-collar 
crime examples showed negligence that led to the physical harm of children and community 
members. Spahr and Afetlison (2004) point out the fact that those working in financial 
institutions and other places of opportunity act as a white-collar crime time bomb. They use 
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime (1990) to explain that people in such positions 
are bound to commit those crimes unless they somehow muster the self-control to refrain. Within 
the governmental agencies that deal with financial regulation and white-collar crime, it becomes 
apparent that some change needs to happen that provides accurate, easily-accessible statistics 
regarding white-collar crime in the United States. This data could be extremely useful to 
government agencies and to the general public. White-collar crime is such a vast area of study, 
and utilizing a few analytical tests on a quantitative dataset regarding savings and loan fraud only 
scratches the surface. This is an area that requires increased attention from scholars and all levels 
of the American people if we seek to bring about an astronomical change in such a seldom-
spoken of topic.   
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Appendix: State Frequency Table 
STATE-CHARACTER VARIABLE 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid AK 1 .2 .2 .2 
AL 2 .3 .3 .5 
AR 12 1.9 1.9 2.3 
AZ 6 .9 .9 3.3 
CA 81 12.5 12.5 15.8 
CO 1 .2 .2 15.9 
CT 3 .5 .5 16.4 
DE 1 .2 .2 16.6 
FL 57 8.8 8.8 25.4 
GA 16 2.5 2.5 27.9 
HI 1 .2 .2 28.0 
IA 8 1.2 1.2 29.3 
IL 13 2.0 2.0 31.3 
IN 3 .5 .5 31.7 
KS 6 .9 .9 32.7 
KY 3 .5 .5 33.1 
LA 25 3.9 3.9 37.0 
MA 23 3.6 3.6 40.6 
MD 3 .5 .5 41.0 
MI 6 .9 .9 42.0 
MN 3 .5 .5 42.4 
MO 5 .8 .8 43.2 
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MS 13 2.0 2.0 45.2 
NC 9 1.4 1.4 46.6 
ND 1 .2 .2 46.7 
NE 1 .2 .2 46.9 
NJ 42 6.5 6.5 53.4 
NM 11 1.7 1.7 55.1 
NV 1 .2 .2 55.3 
NY 31 4.8 4.8 60.1 
OH 9 1.4 1.4 61.5 
OK 14 2.2 2.2 63.6 
OR 6 .9 .9 64.6 
PA 22 3.4 3.4 68.0 
RI 3 .5 .5 68.4 
SC 9 1.4 1.4 69.8 
SD 4 .6 .6 70.4 
TN 23 3.6 3.6 74.0 
TX 138 21.4 21.4 95.4 
UT 3 .5 .5 95.8 
VA 14 2.2 2.2 98.0 
WA 7 1.1 1.1 99.1 
WI 4 .6 .6 99.7 
WY 2 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 646 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Smalley 28 
 
References 
Fetini, Alyssa. 2008. “The Keating Five.” Time. Retrieved December 1, 2017 
(http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1848150,00.html). 
Jennings, Wesley G. and J. Mitchell Miller. 2006. “Examining Regional Variations In 
Punitiveness For Savings And Loan Industry Crime.” Journal of Crime and Justice 
29(1):81–100. 
Michel, Cedric. 2015. “Violent Street Crime Versus Harmful White-Collar Crime: A 
Comparison of Perceived Seriousness and Punitiveness.” Critical Criminology 
24(1):127–43. 
Pontell, Henry N., Kitty Calavita, and Robert Tillman. 1994. “Corporate crime and criminal 
justice system capacity: Government response to financial institution fraud.” Justice 
Quarterly 11(3):383–410. 
Pontell, Henry N., Kitty Calavita, and Robert Tillman. Fraud in the Savings and Loan Industry in 
California, Florida, Texas, and Washington, DC: White-Collar Crime and Government 
Response, 1986-1993. ICPSR06790-v1. AnnArbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [distributor], 1999. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06790.v1 
Spahr, L. l. and L. j. Alison. 2004. “US savings and loan fraud: Implications for general and 
criminal culture theories of crime.” Crime, Law and Social Change 41(1):95–106. 
Tracol, Clement. n.d. “Agent Orange: A State Initiated State-Corporate Crime: The Use of 
Tactical Herbicides during the Vietnam War.” Academia.edu. Retrieved December 1, 
Smalley 29 
 
2017 (http://www.academia.edu/2127366/Agent_Orange_A_State_Initiated_State-
Corporate_Crime_The_Use_of_Tactical_Herbicides_during_the_Vietnam_War). 
Yang, Stephanie. 2014. “5 Years Ago Bernie Madoff Was Sentenced to 150 Years In Prison – 
Here's How His Scheme Worked.” Business Insider. Retrieved December 1, 2017 
(http://www.businessinsider.com/how-bernie-madoffs-ponzi-scheme-worked-2014-7). 
 
 
